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In light of the recent global financial crisis of 2008, this article critically 
compares how China’s national arbitration commissions and local courts 
are responding to new challenges brought about by an increase in the 
number of banking related disputes.  Drawing on comparative case 
analysis, the article examines the operation of the China International 
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) and the Shanghai 
Courts’ financial dispute resolution mechanisms in resolving financial 
disputes.  Drawing on insights from selected case findings, it provides 
insight into which institution is best positioned to handle financial-related 
cases, discusses prospects for coordination between the two, and sets out 
proposals for further reform.  Initial findings suggest that given CIETAC’s 
limited exposure to banking and financial sector disputes, in the 
immediate term parties should seek resolution through local financial 
division dispute resolution mechanisms, such as the financial division of 
                                                 
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Chinese University of Hong Kong (Conjoint 
Professor, Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia).  Ph.D., 
University of New South Wales; B. Eng., LL.B., LL.M., Tsinghua University (China).  
This paper draws on sections of a revised paper presented at the 6th Asian Law Institute 
Conference in Hong Kong in May 2009, and I thank the participants for their comments. 
** Assistant Professor and Deputy Director, LL.M. in Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 
Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong.  B.A., Stanford University; M.A., Landegg 
International University, Switzerland; J.D., Boalt Hall School of Law, University of 
California at Berkeley; Ph.D., University of California at Berkeley. 
‡ The authors thank the Government of Hong Kong’s University Grants Committee for its 
kind support through its Public Policy Research Grant (HKU7001-PPR-10).  Research 
support was also received under the Australian Research Council Discovery Grant entitled 
‘Regulatory Responses to the Global Financial Crisis.’ 
196 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW    [Vol. 7 
 
the Shanghai Courts.  In the long term, prospects for greater 
strengthening of national mechanisms such as CIETAC and the Securities 
Dispute Resolution scheme will provide additional avenues of recourse. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The recent global financial crisis has called into question the 
adequacy of financial institutions and dispute resolution at both the 
national and supranational level.1  Although China has certainly been one 
of the many nations to suffer from this crisis, it has fared relatively well.  
However, it has not been completely immune from the fallout.  Thus, it is 
imperative that China's financial regulatory regime and systems of 
financial dispute resolution be improved to meet the need for more 
efficient financial structures. 
This article will proceed as follows.  First, Part II provides a 
historical background of the development of China’s system of financial 
governance.  Part III proceeds with a more detailed discussion of the 
current Chinese financial system, including a review of the China 
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) and 
various financial dispute resolution cases handled by the Financial 
Division of the Shanghai Courts.  This article then examines possibilities 
for financial governance sector reform.  Part V concludes with the 
suggestion that, for the near future parties can seek resolution through 
institutions like the Shanghai Courts. 
II. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
China has made significant advancement in recent years with 
respect to its systems of financial governance.  This is apparent by 
examining the historical development of its financial governance 
mechanisms. 
A. Before 1978: Limited Financial Dispute Resolution 
Mechanisms 
After the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 
1949, the Communist Party of China gradually moved toward a centrally 
planned economy, similar to that of the Soviet Union.2  As a result of this 
                                                 
1 Hui Huang, Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation in China: Lessons from the 
Global Financial Crisis, 10 J. CORP. L. STUD. 219 (2010). 
2 Id. at 220. 
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“Socialist Transformation” policy, private businesses became collectively 
owned and eventually state-owned. 3   As the economy grew more 
centralized, there was a decreased need for financial markets to fund 
businesses and allocate resources. 
Thus, the financial markets were slowly dismantled.  In 1952, all 
stock exchanges ceased operation, putting an end to the securities market.4  
In 1959, the People's Insurance Company of China (PICC) was shut down, 
which was quickly followed by a closure of the insurance market 
altogether.5  Finally, the People's Bank of China (PBC) became the only 
bank left in China that operated both as the central bank and a commercial 
bank.6  Although the PBC provided the traditional services of saving and 
lending, it functioned more as a governmental instrument rather than a 
commercial bank.7  It was used primarily as a conduit through which state 
money was channeled to fund state-owned enterprises (SOEs).  In sum, 
there was little to no financial regulation at the time. 
Formal legal institutions were largely dissolved prior to 1978.  
The official view was that “justice should not be separated artificially 
from the masses of ordinary people by the barriers of lawyers, laws, and 
law courts.”8  In contrast, “the people in their masses could judge and 
decide questions of policy as well as the concrete disputes arising in 
everyday life.”9  Formal legal systems were not viewed as “flexible 
enough to meet the needs of struggle under rapidly changing revolutionary 
conditions,” 10  but rather as “an instrument for the oppression of 
antagonistic classes.”11  From 1949 to 1978, people’s mediation was 
encouraged as the primary means of resolving civil and commercial 
disputes.  Focused on infusing Socialist ideology and reinforcing class 
                                                 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Linbo Fan, The Insurance Market System, in FINANCIAL REGULATION IN THE GREATER 
CHINA AREA: MAINLAND CHINA, TAIWAN AND HONG KONG SAR 157, 158 (Joseph J. 
Norton et al. eds., 2000). 
6 Huang, supra note 1, at 221. 
7 Id. 
8 YAN WANG, CHINESE LEGAL REFORM: THE CASE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW 22 
(Routledge 2002). 
9 RALPH H. FOLSOM, LAW IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: COMMENTARY, READINGS 
AND MATERIALS 12 (Ralph H. Folsom & John H. Minan eds., 1989). 
10 CARLOS WING-HUNG LO, CHINA'S LEGAL AWAKENING: LEGAL THEORY AND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE IN DENG'S ERA 9 (1995). 
11 Mao Zedong, On People’s Democratic Dictatorship, in 4 SELECTED WORKS OF MAO 
TSE-TUNG 418 (1977). 
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struggle,12 people's mediation became an informal means of promoting 
“correct thought” (sixiang) in the context of resolving civil disputes.13 
B. 1978–1992:  Market Regulation and Dispute Resolution 
In 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the 11th National People’s 
Congress introduced an economic reform policy, marking an important 
watershed in the development of China’s financial markets.14  First, the 
banking system was reformed to keep up with the transition to a market-
oriented economy.15  The “Big Four” state-owned banks were established 
or reopened to provide specialized services, including the Agricultural 
Bank of China (ABC) for the agricultural sector in February of 1979, the 
Bank of China (BOC) for foreign exchange businesses in March of 1979, 
the Construction Bank of China (CBOC) for big construction projects in 
May of 1983, and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) 
for taking over the commercial activities of the PBC in January of 1984.16 
 Banks were set up at both the national and local level, most of 
which were jointly owned by the state and private investors.17  This was 
done to increase market competition in the banking sector.18  In 1994, 
three policy banks (the China Development Bank, the Agricultural 
Development Bank of China, and the Export-Import Bank of China) were 
set up to free the “Big Four” banks from the provision of policy loans, 
enabling them to function as real commercial banks.19 
Other aspects of the financial system also experienced significant 
reforms.  The securities market was revived in the early 1980s, 
culminating in the establishment of the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1990 and 1991, respectively.20  Likewise, the 
insurance market was brought to life with the reopening of the PICC in 
1980 and the formation of more insurance companies thereafter.21 
                                                 
12  See Stanley Lubman, Mao and Mediation: Politics and Dispute Resolution in 
Communist China, 55 CAL. L. REV. 1284, 1306–09 (1967) (examining the political and 
revolutionary function of mediation during the early years of Communist rule, focusing on 
how disputes on a community wide basis were resolved). 
13 Id.; see also 3 SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 117–22 (1965) (stressing the 
importance of the propagation of correct ideas and the correction of mistaken viewpoints 
through rectification movements in Communist leadership). 
14 Huang, supra note 1, at 221. 
15 Id. 
16  Yangxin Huang, The Banking Market System, in FINANCIAL REGULATION IN THE 
GREATER CHINA AREA, supra note 5, at 25, 27–28. 
17 Huang, supra note 1, at 221. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
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As a consequence of the reform, the PBC took on a dual role in 
financial regulation.  First, it performed the major functions of the central 
bank.22  Second, it supervised and regulated the entire financial system, 
including banking, securities, and insurance.23  Thus, the PBC operated, 
essentially, as the single financial regulator at the time. 
In 1978, the flourishing of China’s market economy brought with 
it the proliferation of both formal and informal legal institutions including 
arbitral tribunals and mediation services.  A number of new laws such as 
the Laws on Economic Contracts, the Company Law and the Labor Laws 
were developed to govern the development of China's market economy.24  
In conjunction with the creation of a framework for direct foreign 
investment, the role of agencies like the CIETAC was expanded. 
A significant number of new laws were passed in the period from 
1978 to 1981.  During this time over 200 economic and commercial laws 
were passed.25  The rationale for the proliferation of such laws was to 
“regulate the relationships among different subjects in [the] market . . . 
[and] promote harmonious economic development.”26  As a result of open 
market policies, dispute resolution became less centralized.  Reflecting 
this change was the movement away from managerial dispute resolution 
under a planned economy to increasingly decentralized, court-centered 
litigation.27 
As laws proliferated, so too did the need for legal institutions to 
resolve an increasing number of disputes.  In the period between 1990 and 
1994, civil disputes—largely cases involving contract, property and tort 
law matters—increased from 2.4 million to 3.5 million. 28   Decision 
making devolved outside of factory managerial oversight committees to 
external agencies such as CIETAC and regional arbitral bodies. 
Alternative forms of dispute resolution continued to proliferate as 
formal legal regulations multiplied.  Mediation was to be conducted 
according to the law as described in the Chinese Civil Procedures Code of 
                                                 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 John A. Spanogle, Jr. & Tibor M. Baranski, Jr., Chinese Commercial Dispute Resolution 
Methods: The State Commercial and Industrial Administration Bureau, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 
761, 773–76 (1987) (describing the increasing number of laws and economic policies 
promulgated by China in the late 1970s and early 1980s). 
25 Id. at 774. 
26 To Establish the Legal Framework of Socialist Market Economy: Interveiw with Qiao 
Shi, Member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Communist 
Party Committee and Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress, 1 CHINA LAW 8, 10 (1994). 
27 Minxin Pei, Citizens v. Mandarins: Administrative Litigation in China, 152 CHINA Q. 
832, 862 (1997). 
28 STANLEY B. LUBMAN, SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND CHINA'S STRUGGLE FOR THE RULE 
OF LAW 30 (1997). 
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1991.29  In the mid-1980s, mediation helped to settle more than 90 percent 
of civil cases30 and nearly 60 percent of civil cases were resolved in this 
way by the late 1990s.31 
C. 1992–Present:  Multiple Sectors-based Regulators and the 
Emergence of CIETAC 
In the 1990s, China embraced financial regulation by sector,32 
establishing separate regulators for banking, securities, and insurance.33  
In April 1998, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), 
which had been founded in 1992, was vested with the exclusive authority 
to regulate the securities market; 34  the China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission (CIRC) was established in November 1998 in response to a 
robust insurance market; and in April 2003, the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC) took over the responsibility of direct banking 
regulation from the PBC. 
These three regulatory commissions, along with the PBC acting as 
the central bank, constituted China’s financial regulatory framework, often 
referred to as “yihang sanhui” (i.e., one bank, three commissions).  This 
model of regulation by sector reflects a policy commonly known as “fenye 
jingying, fenye jianguan,” or “separate operation, separate regulation.”35 
While in-court litigation continued to develop following the 1980s 
Open Door Policy, arbitration institutions likewise developed an 
expanding case load.  The CIETAC has handled over 10,000 international 
arbitration cases since it opened in  1956.  More than 700 cases, largely 
                                                 
29 See generally Fu Hualing & Richard Cullen, From Mediatory to Adjudicatory Justice: 
The Limits of Civil Justice Reform in China, in CHINESE JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 25–27 (Margaret Woo & Mary Gallagher eds., 
2008) (describing the shift from adjudicatory justice to mediatory justice during Xiao 
Yang’s tenure as President of the Supreme People’s Court). 
30 Id. at 23. 
31 LAW YEARBOOK CHINA (Zhongguo Falü Nianjian She 1983–1995). 
32 See generally Huang, supra note 1 (noting the inadequacies of China’s traditional 
sectoral system of financial regulation). 
33 For a fuller discussion of the development of China’s financial reforms after its WTO 
accession, see, e.g., FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM IN POST-WTO CHINA (James 
Barth et al. eds., 2006). 
34 HUI HUANG, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS: INSIDER TRADING LAW IN CHINA 18–
19 (2006). 
35 See Huang Hui (黄辉), Jinrong Jianguan Xiandai hua: Yingmei Faxi de Jingyan yu 
Jiaoxun (金融监管现代化：英美法系的经验与教训) [Financial Regulatory 
Modernization: Experiences and Lessons from the U.S. and UK Common Law 
Jurisdictions] 1 GUANGDONG SHEHUI KEXUE (广东社会科学) 181, 185 (2009) (describing 
the development of sector-based financial regulation in China). 
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international in nature, are handled by CIETAC on an annual basis.36  
Beyond in-court litigation and CIETAC arbitration, financial disputes may 
be resolved through recourse to provincial arbitral bodies such as the 
Shenzhen Arbitration Commission (SAC) and local mediation services. 
III. THE CURRENT STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE IN 
CHINA 
Financial Regulatory Oversight 
The PBC is responsible for monetary policy and market stability, 
while the CBRC, the CSRC, and the CIRC are responsible for the 
regulation of the banking, securities, and insurance sectors, respectively.  
These four regulatory bodies will be discussed infra seriatim. 
The PBC is the central bank in China, as dictated by the Law on 
the People’s Bank of China (PBC Law).37  The PBC’s mandate is to 
formulate and implement monetary policies, guard against financial risks, 
and maintain financial stability under the leadership of the State Council.38  
Thus, the PBC performs three roles, which are common to most central 
banks:  (1) it issues currency (i.e., the Renminbi); (2) it operates as a 
lender to banks; and (3) it operates as a bank to the government.39  Instead 
of direct market intervention, the PBC seeks to stabilize the currency and 
the financial system through indirect, macroeconomic means, such as 
deposit reserves, the rediscount rate, interest rates, and open market 
operations.40 
 The CBRC came into existence in 2003, assuming the monitoring 
responsibilities of the PBC.  The Law of the PRC on Commercial Banks41 
and the Law of the PRC on Banking Regulation and Supervision42 govern 
                                                 
36 China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission, BIZCHINANOW (Mar. 
11, 2001, 2:09 PM), 
http://bizchinanow.com/Contents/Channel_1847/2007/0828/60510/content_60510.htm. 
37 Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang Fa (中国人民银行法) [Law on the People’s Bank of China] 
(promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 18, 1995, effective Mar. 18, 1995, 
amended by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 27, 2003, effective Dec. 27, 
2003), art. 2 (China). 
38 Id. 
39 See id. art. 4.  It should be noted that the State Administration of Foreign Exchange is a 
government agency under the leadership of the PBC and it acts as the implementation 
branch of the PBC in relation to foreign exchange administration and supervision. 
40 Zhongguo Renmin Yinghang Fa, supra note 37, art. 23. 
41 Shangye Yinhang Fa (商业银行法) [Law on Commercial Banks] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., May 10, 1995, effective July 1, 1995, amended by 
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 27, 2003) (China). 
42  Yinhang Ye Jiandu Guanli Fa (银行业监督管理法 ) [Law on Regulation and 
Administration on Banking Industry] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
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the CBRC, which operates as a ministry unit under leadership of the State 
Council.  The CIRC was established in 1998 under the Insurance Law of 
the PRC.43  The CIRC regulates market conduct within the insurance 
sector.  The Securities Law of the PRC (Securities Law) set up the 
regulatory framework for the securities market.44  Established in 1992, the 
CSRC, which is responsible for securities regulation in China, is the oldest 
of the three sector-specific regulatory bodies.  The Securities Law’s scope 
is expansive, authorizing the CSRC to regulate all financial instruments, 
including equities, bonds, and derivative instruments.45 
Resolution of Financial Disputes 
Within the various sectors described above, dedicated financial 
dispute resolution can be conducted through CIETAC or the courts.46  In 
the sections that follow, these schemes will be described alongside a 
detailed case analysis of the types of cases handled by these bodies. 
A. Institutional Arbitration—CIETAC 
Within China, arbitration continues to be among the more favored 
mechanisms for financial dispute resolution.47  Institutional arbitration is 
the sole option for disputants as ad hoc arbitration has no legal standing 
according to Chinese law.48  Therefore, parties to an arbitration in China 
will be required to select a recognized domestic arbitral institution and 
select the specific arbitration format from among those listed on the 
institution’s rosters. 
 
                                                                                                               
Cong., Dec. 27, 2003, effective Feb. 1, 2004, amended by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Oct. 31, 2006, effective Jan. 1, 2007) (China). 
43 Baoxian Fa (保险法) [Insurance Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Jun. 30, 1995, effective Oct. 1, 1995, amended by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2002, effective Jan. 1, 2003, amended by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 28, 2009, effective Oct. 1, 2009), art. 9 (China). 
44 Zhengquan Fa (证券法) [Securities Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1998, effective July 1, 1999, amended by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 28, 2004, effective Aug. 28, 2004, amended by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan.1, 2006) (China). 
45 Id. art. 2. 
46 See Dispute Avoidance and Dispute Resolution, EXPORT.GOV (Apr. 15, 2011), 
http://export.gov/china/doingbizinchina/riskmanagement/eg_cn_028283.asp (explaining 
the primary methods of avoiding and resolving disputes in China). 
47 Shoushuang Li, Insight into Commercial Dispute Resolution in China, HONG KONG 
LAWYER (Jan. 2004), http://www.hk-lawyer.com/InnerPages_features/0/1068/2004/1. 
48 Id. 
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1. Chinese Arbitration Commissions 
China is home to a large number of arbitral organizations.  Among 
the most prominent is the China International Trade and Arbitration 
Commission (hereinafter CIETAC).  Largely handling commercial and 
economic cases, CIETAC most recently in 2003 adoped a set of Rules 
pertaining to Financial Dispute Arbitration which covers disputes between 
parties arising in connection with financial transactions.49  Plans are under 
way to further develop the rules for financial disputes and proposals for 
such provisions have been solicited.50 
The mission of CIETAC since its founding in 1956 has been to 
provide a forum for resolving economic and trade related disputes.51  In 
addition to its central location in Beijing it has branch offices located 
throughout China including Tianjin, Shanghai and Shenzhen.  Its 
headquarters in Tianjin are know as the CIETAC Financial Arbitration 
Center.52  At present, there are over twenty-one branch offices serving the 
needs of various business sectors in China.  Each branch is governed by a 
secretariat which helps coordinate the activities and cases handled within 
each branch.53 
Beyond CIETAC, more than 140 provincial arbitration 
commissions operate in over 140 cities including Shanghai, Guangzhou, 
Beijing and Shenzhen.54  Of these commissions, a large number have also 
established financial arbitration services in response to the growing need 
for a forum to handle banking-related disputes.  For example, a large 
number of such commissions, primarily those located in financial centers 
such as Shanghai, established financial arbitration commissions beginning 
in 2007.  Later similar programs were established in Chongqing, 
Hangzhou, Guangdong and Wuhan.55  Such centers have been established 
                                                 
49 Financial Disputes Arbitration Rules (promulgated by the China International Economic 
and Trade Arbitration Commission, revised and adopted by the China Council for the 
Promotion of International Trade/China Chamber of International Commerce on Mar. 17, 
2005, effective May 1, 2005) CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION 
COMMISSION, art. 1, available at 
http://www.cietac.org/index/rules/47607aa1ab746c7f001.cms. 
50 See Guanyu Xiuding “Zhongguo Guoji Jingji Maoyi Zhongcai Weiyuan Hui Zhongcai 
Guize” Zhengxun Yijian de Tongzhi (关于修订《中国国际经济贸易仲裁委员会仲裁规
则 》 征 询 意 见 的 通 知 ), CIETAC (Dec. 7, 2009), 
http://cn.cietac.org/NewsFiles/NewsDetail.asp?NewsID=896 (Chinese) (calling for 
submission of comments and suggestions to the CIETAC Arbitration institute). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 EXPORT.GOV, supra note 46. 
55 See Jiang Yaya, Liu Ying & Lu Yibo (蒋娅娅，刘颖 & 陆一波), Shanghai Jinrong 
Zhongcai Yuan Chengli (上海金融仲裁院成立) [Establishment of the Shanghai Financial 
Arbitration Commission], SHANGHAI ZHONGCAI FA YANJIU ZHONGXIN (上海仲裁法研究中
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to provide a space for citizens to seek out assistance when faced with 
abusive practices by banking institutions.56  The Shenzhen Arbitration 
Commission has also recently developed a similar financial arbitration 
service.57 
2. Financial Dispute Resolution System Through CIETAC 
CIETAC, beyond helping to resolve a large number of 
commercial and economic cases, has established a financial dispute 
resolution mechanism to handle banking-related disputes within China.  It 
has established a set of Rules which aim to provide speedy and competent 
case handling for financial related disputes. 
3. Examining CIETAC’s Financial Arbitration Rules 
CIETAC issued the “China International Economic and Trade 
Arbitration Commission Financial Disputes Arbitration Rules” 
(hereinafter the Rules) in March of 2005.  These rules came into force on 
May 1, 2005, after being revised by the China Council for the Promotion 
of International Trade/China Chamber of International Commerce. The 
Rules were created in order to facilitate the “impartial and prompt 
resolution of disputes arising from financial transactions between the 
parties.”58  The scope of disputes covered by the Rules include those 
“arising from, or in connection with, financial transactions between the 
parties.”59  “Financial transactions” are defined as: 
transactions arising between financial institutions inter se, 
or arising between financial institutions and other natural 
or legal persons in the currency, capital, foreign exchange, 
gold and insurance markets that relate to financing in both 
                                                                                                               
心 ) [SHANGHAI ARBITRATION LAW RESEARCH CENTER] (Dec. 19, 2007), 
http://www.arsh.sjtu.edu.cn/view_news.jsp?newsid=77 (Chinese) (announcing the 
inauguration of the Shanghai Financial Arbitration Court). 
56 Yu Chengli Xibu Shoujia Jinrong Zhongcai Yuan, Shu Guonei Di Er Zhuanmen Jigou 
(渝成立西部首家金融仲裁院, 属国内第2专门机构) [The Establishment of the First 
Arbitration Institution in the West of China, Chongqing, the Second-largest Specialized 
Institution in the Country], CHONGQING DAILY (July 29, 2010), 
http://www.cq.xinhuanet.com/business/2010-07/29/content_20471602.htm (Chinese). 
57 Shenzhen Jinrong Zhongcai Yuan Jianjie (深圳金融仲裁院简介) [Introduction to the 
Shenzhen Financial Arbitration Commission], SHENZHEN ZHONGCAI WEIYUAN HUI (深圳
仲 裁 委 员 会 ) [SHENZHEN ARBITRATION COMMISSION] (Jan. 12, 2011), 
http://www.fabao365.com/news/657785.html (Chinese). 
58 Financial Disputes Arbitration Rules, supra note 49. 
59 Id. art. 2. 
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domestic and foreign currencies, and the assignment and 
sale of financial instruments and documents denominated 
in both domestic and foreign currencies . . . .60 
When bringing a dispute under the Rules, disputants must specify 
whether they intend to use mediation or arbitration.  If arbitration is 
selected under the Rules and no institution is specified, then the 
assumption is that the parties intended CIETAC.61  Therefore, CIETAC is 
among the most frequently used institutions for the resolution of financial 
disputes. 
In addition to permitting parties to specify their selected method 
and location for the resolution of financial disputes, the Rules permit them 
to select an arbitrator from a specialized Panel comprised of experts 
within the financial industry.  The final approval of the arbitrators rests 
with the CIETAC Chairman.  Parties may also select the number of 
arbitrators (either one or three) and where parties have not made a prior 
determination, the CIETAC Chairman will make a determination 
according to Article 12.  The specialized financial arbitration panel is 
comprised of over 100 individuals from diverse backgrounds including 
experts from Canada, the United States, EU countries including France, 
the UK and the Netherlands, as well as mainland China, Macau SAR and 
HKSAR.  Many of these panel members have expertise in finance as well 
as Banking Law, Arbitration Law, Company Law and Contracts. 
When determining the final award, the Panel will look to the 
language of the contract, industry standards, and principles of 
reasonableness and fairness.  In some cases, foreign law may be selected 
as the substantive law of the arbitration if the case involves a foreign 
element.  However, the final selection of the substantive law to be applied 
rests with the arbitral tribunal.  In the event that a particular case or issue 
is not covered by the Financial Arbitration Rules, then reference will be 
made to the general CIETAC Arbitration Rules. 
With respect to the issuance of the final award, Article 12 of the 
Rules states that the award is to be issued within 45 days from the 
constitution of the tribunal, unless the parties agree otherwise.  This period 
may be extended by up to 20 days as needed with the consent of the 
Secretary-General. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
60 Id. 
61 Financial Disputes Arbitration Rules, supra note 49. 
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a. First Case Accepted by CIETAC Tianjin International 
Economic and Financial Arbitration Center 
The CIETAC Tianjin International Economic and 
Financial Arbitration Center accepted its first case in 2008.62  The case 
involved a nine million yuan sale of goods dispute.  The Tianjin office 
was set up to serve Tianjin’s rapidly developing financial sector in 
providing a neutral forum for the resolution of disputes. 
b. Recent CIETAC Financial and Commercial Dispute 
Resolution Cases 
Below is a selection of CIETAC’s recent financial and 
commercial cases.  What can be observed from these cases is the 
following:  most all of the cases involve issues relating to the sale of 
goods, capital contributions, lease contracts, etc.  As a result, CIETAC has 
had limited exposure to banking related cases.  Nevertheless, for the cases 
it has handled, it has achieved a relatively uniform process of case 
handling through reference to commercial agreements, existing law, and 
trade practice. 
i. Dispute over Capital Contribution in a Joint Venture 
(Published 2009)63 
One case involved a dispute between two parties who signed an 
agreement to establish a limited liability entertainment company.  The 
contract required both parties to contribute capital, including a one-time 
payment of registered capital made within five months of acquiring the 
necessary license to conduct business.  The claimant alleged that the 
respondent was unable to fulfill its obligations because the property it 
intended to provide as capital belonged to the government of the district 
where the joint venture was located and the government had already 
mortgaged it to a bank.  The respondent counterargued that the claimant 
had not fully contributed the amount of capital required by the contract:  
the foreign exchange that it had originally promised to contribute was not 
paid and the equipment provided fell short of the required amount. 
                                                 
62 Maozhong Tianjin Guoji Jingji Jinrong Zhongcai Zhongxin Shouli Diyi An (贸仲天津国
际经济金融仲裁中心受理第一案) [The First Case Accepted by Tianjin International 
Economic and Financial CIETAC Arbitration Center], TIANJIN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
AND FINANCIAL ARBITRATION CENTER OF THE CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND 
TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION (Dec. 10, 2008), http://www.cietac-
tj.org/newsfiles/NewsDetail.asp?NewsID=45. 
63  Dispute Over Capital Contribution in a Joint Venture, CIETAC (July 15, 2009), 
http://www.cietac.org/index/references/cases/47603791dea0167f001.cms. 
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According to the terms of the contract, the claimant referred the 
matter to CIETAC for arbitration.  The arbitral tribunal found that the 
respondent did not have legal rights to the property that was to be used as 
its capital contribution and hence did not carry its investment obligations.  
The claimant also did not completely execute its investment obligations 
under the terms of the contract.  Therefore, the tribunal determined that 
the joint venture contract should be terminated and the claimant’s requests 
for compensation should be rejected. 
Here, the subject matter of the dispute—a capital contribution 
agreement—was more commercial, rather than financial, in nature.  The 
case determination was made primarily on the basis of the terms of the 
contract.  Therefore, parties are advised to consider such terms carefully, 
in light of future adjudication. 
ii. Dispute over a Contract for the Sale of Goods—Contract 
Revision and Reserving the Right to Seek Compensation for 
Damages (Published 2009)64 
Another case involved a dispute between the claimant and 
respondent French company, who signed a contract for the sale of glass 
production equipment which the claimant intended for resale to its partner 
companies in China in February 1996.  The contract required the claimant 
buyer to open an irrevocable letter of credit for the full contract price with 
the respondent seller 60 days before loading.  The claimant opened a letter 
of credit as required by the contract but the respondent failed to deliver the 
equipment according to schedule.  When the respondent finally delivered 
the equipment one and a half months later, the claimant demanded that the 
respondent pay penalties according to the contract for late delivery of 
goods, and sought additional compensation on the basis that the 
respondent’s late delivery had caused the claimant to violate its resale 
contracts with its partner companies as well as the cost of altering the 
letter of credit.  The claimant argued that revision of the letter of credit 
was independent of the main contract and therefore it did not amount to 
revision of the contract, while the respondent argued that the revision of 
the letter of credit extended the original date of delivery in the contract. 
The arbitral tribunal found that although the letter of credit existed 
independently of the main body of the contract, it still originated from the 
contract.  Generally speaking, revision of the major articles of a contract, 
such as the date of delivery of goods, should be viewed as equivalent to 
the revision of the contract itself.  A party may agree to revise a letter of 
credit with or without conditions, but it should protect its right to seek 
                                                 
64 Dispute Over a Contract for the Sale of Goods―Contract Revision and Reserving the 
Right to Seek Compensation for Damages, CIETAC (July 15, 2009), 
http://www.cietac.org/index/references/cases/47603791dcfea17f001.cms. 
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compensation by expressly reserving its right to seek compensation later 
based on the provisions of the contract.  If a party seeks to revise a letter 
of credit without reservation, it abandons its right to seek compensation in 
the future.  Therefore, the claimant lost its contractual right to seek 
compensation from respondent based on late delivery of goods, as the 
respondent delivered the equipment within the time limit set by the 
revised letter of credit. 
Here CIETAC primarily considered the parties initial and 
subsequent revisions to its contract and reasoned that revision to the letter 
of credit (LOC) without conditions amounted to a change in the 
underlying contract itself and therefore that the claimant was not entitled 
to damages. 
iii. Lease Contract Dispute—Obvious Loss of Fairness and 
Exercise of the Right to Revoke a Contract (Published 
2009)65 
The claimant, a Hong Kong citizen, and the respondent, a Beijing-
based real estate company, signed a contract in 1996 where the claimant 
agreed to lease to the respondent its property in Beijing.  Before the 
contract was signed, the respondent agreed to sublet the property to a 
department store.  According to the contract, if the rent obtained by the 
respondent from subletting the property exceeded a certain minimum 
amount, the respondent could claim the remainder, and if the rent fell 
under the minimum amount, the respondent was required to pay the 
remainder to the claimant.  In 1999, the claimant applied to CIETAC for 
arbitration on the basis that the respondent failed to pay the required 
amount of rent.  The respondent argued that the sum it was required to pay 
by the contract far exceeded the amount of rent it obtained from the 
sublease, therefore the contract had lost its fairness under Article 5 of the 
Contract Law of PRC and should be revoked. 
The arbitral tribunal found that, as the contract contained explicit 
provisions regarding the calculation and payment of rent, the respondent 
still had the obligation to pay the minimum required rent to the claimant 
regardless of how much rent the respondent obtained from the sublease.  
When the respondent signed the lease contract with the claimant, it had 
already agreed to sublet the property for a third party for an amount less 
than the rent it would have to pay to the claimant so the respondent was 
clearly aware of the price differential.  Also according to Articles 54 and 
55 of the Contract Law, if a contract loses equality, a party has the right to 
request that the court or arbitral tribunal permit modification or revocation 
                                                 
65 Lease Contract Dispute―Obvious Loss of Fairness and the Exercise of the Right to 
Revoke a Contract, CIETAC (July 15, 2009). 
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of the contract within one year of when it knew or should have known that 
it had cause to do so.  As the respondent did not attempt to exercise its 
right until three years after signing the contract, the respondent had lost its 
right to seek revocation even if the contract had actually become unfair. 
This case, which involved a lease and sublease agreement, 
primarily revolved around the running of a limitations time period.  
Because the respondent waited until three years after signing the contract, 
he lost his right to seek revocation. 
iv. Execution of Duties of a Contract for the International 
Sale of Goods66 
The claimant seller and the respondent buyer signed a contract 
under which the claimant agreed to supply the respondent with five 
thousand tons of peanuts.  The contract required the buyer to open an 
irrevocable, transferable letter of credit with the seller as beneficiary 
fifteen days before the loading date.  The respondent failed to open a letter 
of credit and cancelled the contract on the ground that there was 
insufficient time to arrange the loading of the ship.  The claimant sought 
compensation for damages.  The respondent’s failure to open the letter of 
credit and arrange shipping forced the claimant to convert the product into 
peanut oil, resulting in financial losses.  The respondent counterargued 
that examination of the goods before the loading period indicted that the 
product did not meet the required standard and hence it did not open a 
letter of credit. 
The arbitral tribunal confirmed the claimant’s request for 
compensation resulting from the respondent’s fundamental breach of 
contract from failing to open the letter of credit.  Regardless of the 
claimant’s usual practice to open a letter of credit only after the parties 
examined the product together and determined the required standard was 
met, contractual obligations will always supersede an implicit 
understanding. 
Here CIETAC relied first on the contract as stated, as opposed to 
industry practice.  Because the opening of a letter of credit was not 
contingent on product quality, the respondent was contractually bound to 
open the letter of credit.  As he failed to do so, he was in breach of the 
contract. 
 
 
 
                                                 
66 Problem in the Sequence of the Execution of Duties in a Contract for the International 
Sale of Goods, CIETAC (July 16, 2009), http://www.cietac.org/index.cms. 
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c. Assessment of Cases 
As can be seen from the above sample of CIETAC cases, the 
majority of those cited deal with some variation of a contractual dispute, 
whether it be for the sale of goods, the opening of a letter of credit, 
subleasing agreements or product quality.  None of the cases reviewed 
above directly involve banking- or financing-related disputes.   While 
CIETAC maintains a list of highly qualified and well established financial 
dispute resolution practitioners, given the limited number of finance 
related cases thus far referred to CIETAC, a question arises as to the 
preparation of CIETAC on the whole to handle financial- and banking-
related matters. 
Why might the number of financial dispute resolution cases 
brought to CIETAC be low?  In general, CIETAC is among the most well 
known arbitral institutions in China and the first to introduce a financial 
dispute resolution system.  Therefore, it is not the lack of awareness or the 
absence of a specialized program that has deterred users.  One reason 
might be that CIETAC case handling fees are less expensive when 
compared with other international arbitration venues, but relative to 
general income levels in China, CIETAC fees can still be high.  As a 
result, case fees may serve as a deterrent to midsize businesses and sole 
proprietorships. 
B. Shanghai Courts—Financial Division 
The Shanghai Courts have handled a wider range and larger 
number of financial and banking related cases than CIETAC.  As will be 
seen below, the Shanghai Courts have had more extensive experience 
handling financial and corporate claims. 
Case Handling 
A recent study conducted by the Shanghai High Court analyzed 
the case intake and disposition of financial-related cases.67  The study 
found that the Court handled over 1,165 financial criminal cases in 2010 
(an increase of 38.3 percent from the previous year), and 22,278 financial 
and commercial civil cases (an increase of 29.6 percent from the previous 
year).  The total case value exceeded 6.4 billion RMB.  The civil cases 
involved loan agreements, insurance contracts, securities, financial leasing 
                                                 
67 Woyuan Juxing Xilie Shenpan Baipishu Fabu Hui (我院举行系列审判白皮书发布会) 
[Press Conference on the Issue of White Papers], SHANGHAI NO.2 INTERMEDIATE PEOPLE’S 
COURT, http://www.shezfy.com/view.html?id=55150 (last visited  Aug. 26, 2011). 
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arrangements, credit cards and trust funds, while the criminal cases 
involved issues such as credit card fraud, bill fraud and sales.68 
Relevant Cases 
Below is a sample of relevant cases handled by the Financial 
Division of the Shanghai Courts.  The sample illustrates the growing depth 
and breadth of experience in handling financial-related issues and the use 
of mediation in some cases. 
1. Abuse of Majority Shareholder Power (Published 2008)69 
This case involved a plaintiff and defendant who were originally 
the only two shareholders in a company with registered capital of 21 
million RMB, respectively holding 15 percent and 85 percent stakes.  
Under the pretext of addressing company liquidity problems, the 
defendant, who was also the majority shareholder, held several 
shareholder meetings between April and September 2005 to approve the 
injection of capital by itself and a third party “strategic partner” company.  
The capital injection allowed the defendant to increase his stake in the 
company to 73.7 percent and the third party “strategic partner” company 
obtained 20 percent while the minority shareholder’s stake was reduced to 
6.3 percent.  The plaintiff sued the defendant for abuse of the position of 
majority shareholder. 
The appellate court, in consideration of the deteriorated 
relationship between the two parties, persuaded them to reach a mediation 
agreement where the defendant agreed to purchase the plaintiff’s entire 
equity interest and pay the plaintiff a one-off compensation of 6.1 million 
RMB. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
68 Ying Yilin (应一琳), Xinyong Ka Zhapian Cheng Jinrong Fanzui Zhongzai Qu (信用卡
诈骗成金融犯罪重灾区 ) [Credit Card Fraud Becomes the Most Common Financial 
Crime], SHANGHAI BUSINESS DAILY (Mar. 11, 2011), 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20110311/11109512831.shtml. 
69 Dong Li yu Shanghai Zhida Jianshe Fazhan Youxian Gongsi deng Gudong Lanyong 
Gudong Quanli Peichang Jiufen Shangsu An (董力与上海致达建设发展有限公司等股东
滥用股东权利赔偿纠纷上诉案) [Appeal on Dispute Between Dong Li and Shanghai 
Zhida Jianshe Fazhan Co., Ltd. and Other Shareholders Over Compensation for the Abuse 
of Majority Shareholder Power], SHANGHAI NO.2 INTERMEDIATE PEOPLE’S COURT (Sept. 3, 
2008), http://www.shezfy.com/view/jpa/detail.html?id=175 (last visited Aug. 26, 2011). 
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2. Request for Winding Up of Company (Published 2006)70 
This case involved a claim by plaintiff subsidiary company 
against the defendant parent company.  The plaintiffs claimed that the 
defendant parent company refused to hold shareholder and director 
meetings resulting in severe difficulties in the management and normal 
operation of the company. 
After a review of the facts, the court held for the defendant, 
indicating that the plaintiffs should also bear responsibility for the 
unfavourable state of management of the company which was partly 
attributed to their breach of contract. 
3. Fraudulent Shareholder Investment71 
One case involved a joint venture agreement entered into by two 
defendants in June 1999.  Although the official registration records 
indicated that the company had registered capital of 5 million RMB, the 
two defendant shareholders had in fact paid nothing.  In 2004, the 
company increased its registered investment capital to 10 million RMB, 
with the two shareholder’s funding obligations still unfulfilled.  A debt 
crisis hit the company and the suppliers, bank and other debtors sued the 
company and its two shareholders. 
The court held that shareholders were required to pay the full 
contribution in order to set up a company.  As the company’s actual 
capital was below that of the legal minimum, its corporate status was not 
established and the defendant shareholders were, as a result, jointly and 
severally liable for the company’s debts. 
 
 
                                                 
70 Shanghai Boxing Jiyin Xinpian Youxian Zeren Gongsi, Shanghai Bode Jiyin Kaifa 
Youxian Gongsi, Bohai yu Shanghai Sanmao Qiye (Jituan) Gufen Youxian Gongsi deng 
Gudong Qingqiu Jiesan Gongsi Jiufen An (上海博星基因芯片有限责任公司、上海博德
基因开发有限公司、董海与上海三毛企业（集团）股份有限公司等股东请求解散公
司纠纷案) [Dispute Over (Shareholders’) Request to Dissolve the Company] (Sept. 8, 
2006), SHANGHAI NO.2 INTERMEDIATE PEOPLE’S COURT, 
http://www.shezfy.com/view/jpa/detail.html?id=111 (last visited Aug. 26, 2011). 
71 Eight cases on financial and investment risks were heard by the Shanghai High Court on 
September 19, 2010.  See Gao Yuan (高远), Shanghai Gaoyuan Tongbao Baqi Fengxian 
Jingshi Anli (上海高院通报8起风险警示案例) [Shanghai High Court Report on 8 
Typical Cases on Financial and Investment Risks], SHANGHAI FINANCIAL NEWS  (Oct. 12, 
2010, 1:17 AM) 
http://www.shfinancialnews.com/xww/2009jrb/node5019/node5036/node5048/userobject1
ai66151.html (discussing eight companies involved in litigation in the Shanghai Higher 
People’s Court). 
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4. Breach of Fiduciary Duty by Management72 
This case involved a dispute between a defendant manager for a 
foreign company responsible for the company’s sales in the South China 
region and the foreign company.  In the course of his employment, the 
defendant obtained profits for himself through side dealing and fraudulent 
means.  The company dismissed the defendant and sued him for 
compensation of losses suffered by the company. 
The court held that the defendant owed duties of loyalty 
(including a prohibition against self-dealing) to the company.  As a result 
of the defendant’s breach, the court ordered him to disgorge any profits 
and compensate the company for the losses it suffered. 
5. Company Refusal to Award Shareholder Dividends 
This case involved a dispute between a shareholder (the plaintiff) 
and his company (the defendant).  In January 2008, the plaintiff was 
arrested and held in custody for a crime that he was subsequently 
acquitted of.  During the period of custody, the defendant company 
distributed shareholder dividends for the year of 2007 to all shareholders 
except the plaintiff.  The plaintiff sought a payment of his dividends after 
his release. 
The court held that shareholder rights are not affected even when 
a shareholder is under custody by the police.  The defendant was ordered 
to pay the plaintiff his dividends accordingly. 
6. Company Deregistration Prior to Liquidation 
This case involved a plaintiff real estate company, which was set 
up in 1999 and deregistered in March 2006.  During the period when the 
company was in operation, it purchased 0.5 million RMB worth of 
construction materials from the defendant, which remained unpaid at the 
time of deregistration. 
The court held that, even after a company is deregistered and 
wound up, the shareholders are still under the responsibility to liquidate 
the company according to law.  The court ordered the shareholders to 
compensate the defendant for any losses suffered due to the non-payment 
for the materials.73 
                                                 
72 Id. 
73 Song Xuan (宋璇), Weiji Xia Shanghai Jinrong Anjian Jizeng (危机下上海金融案件激
增) [Surge in Financial Litigation as Financial Crisis Hits Shanghai], PEOPLE.COM.CN, 
(May 21, 2009), http://paper.people.com.cn/gjjrb/html/2009-05/21/content_257709.htm. 
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C. Summary 
From a review of the case intake of the Financial Division, it is 
clear that the Shanghai Courts have extensive exposure to financial related 
cases.74  Overall, given its low case intake fees in comparison with 
CIETAC and its more extensive case exposure, it would appear that in the 
short term, parties may be best served by reference to specialized financial 
court dispute resolution mechanisms, while in the long term, as arbitral 
bodies gain greater exposure to financial- and banking-related disputes, 
such mechanisms will provide additional viable options for disputing 
parties in the future. 
IV. LESSONS FROM THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
What lessons can be learned from the global financial crisis?  
How can such lessons be applied to the development of China’s financial 
governance systems in the future?  Although China’s financial markets 
and institutions have been affected by the global financial crisis, the 
impact appears less direct and less severe than is the case with overseas 
markets.75  The Chinese financial system as a whole has survived the crisis 
in relatively good shape:  no major financial institutions have fallen and 
no major scandals over transactions involving complex financial products 
have occurred. The losses suffered by Chinese financial institutions are 
essentially the consequence of their ill-fated investment in and exposure to 
overseas markets rather than domestic markets. Further, the overall risk 
exposure of China’s financial institutions and listed companies in overseas 
markets is quite limited and manageable. 
However, one would be wrong to conclude, judging from the 
relatively good health of the Chinese financial markets following the 
financial crisis, that China’s financial regulatory system is problem-free.  
Rather, a closer examination reveals the irony that the good fortune of 
China’s financial system in this financial crisis is largely attributable to 
the relative simplicity of its financial products and isolation from the 
global economy. 
To begin with, the Chinese financial markets continue to have 
much room for development.  At present, the financial products traded on 
the Chinese financial markets are limited and the technology of 
securitization is yet to be widely used.  There are some traditional 
financial derivatives in China such as options and warrants, but they are 
                                                 
74 See Shanghai Fayuan Falü Wenshu Jiansuo Zhongxin (上海法院法律文书检索中心), 
http://www.hshfy.sh.cn:8081/flws/list.jsp (last visited Dec. 26, 2011) (listing cases that 
have been adjudicated by the Shanghai Courts). 
75 Hui Huang, China’s Legal Responses to the Global Financial Crisis: From Domestic 
Reform to International Engagement, 12 AUSTL. J. ASIAN L. 157. 
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far fewer than those found in overseas markets and far less sophisticated 
than their overseas counterparts, including collateralized debt obligations 
(CDOs), collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) and synthetic CDOs.  As 
securitization and complex financial instruments have now been identified 
as one of the core causes of the current financial crisis,76 it is not hard to 
understand why China’s financial system has not suffered any homegrown 
problems. 
On the other hand, the isolation of the Chinese financial system 
from the outside world has helped to stop the flow-on effect of the 
financial crisis in China.  Although China has worked to open up its 
financial markets since its accession to the WTO, this process has been 
gradual, cautious, and ongoing.  For the time being, foreigners have 
limited access to the Chinese financial markets.  For example, foreign 
investors cannot trade in China’s stock market except through several 
designated means such as the program for Qualified Foreign Institutional 
Investors (QFII).77  Further, the Chinese government still exerts tight 
control over its currency policy.  For instance, there are restrictions on 
capital accounts; the Chinese currency, the Renminbi or yuan, is not fully 
convertible yet; the exchange rate is set in a managed floating range.78  All 
these measures have collectively operated as a firewall to insulate China’s 
financial system from the spills of the financial crisis overseas. 
China can take some comfort from the fact that its financial 
system has sustained relatively modest losses in the current financial crisis.  
However, it should not be overjoyed about its lucky escape, overlooking 
the real problems it has faced.  As observed by the People’s Bank’s 
Governor, the fault of the previous crisis was “not in the technical 
sophistication of the products”79  but rather arose from “problems in 
information disclosure or the pricing mechanisms.” 80   Others have 
observed that the technology of securitization and financial derivatives, if 
                                                 
76 See e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A Berle Professor of Law at Columbia Law Sch., 
Keynote Address of the Third Annual Supreme Court/Law Society Conference on 
Corporate Law 2008: Financial Crises 101: What Can We Learn from Scandals and 
Meltdowns—from Enron to Subprime? (Aug. 2008), available at 
http://sydney.edu.au/law/news/docs_pdfs_images/2008/2008RossParsonsAddressPodcast.
mp3. 
77 See HUI HUANG, supra note 34, at 12–13 (describing the QFII mechanism and other 
means for foreigners to invest in China’s stock market). 
78 See China to Make RMB Convertible on Capital Account in 5 Years, CHINA DAILY (Jan. 
19, 2011, 9:28 AM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2011-
01/19/content_11878739.htm (discussing China’s plan to make its currency convertible on 
the capital account). 
79 LEO F. GOODSTADT, RELUCTANT REGULATORS: HOW THE WEST CREATED AND HOW 
CHINA SURVIVED THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 12 (2011). 
80 Zhou Xiaochuan, Governor, People’s Bank of China, Instability and the Evolution of the 
Financial System, Speech at the Global Management Forum (Oct. 30, 2007), available at 
http://www.bis.org/review/r071213a.pdf?frames=0. 
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used and regulated properly, can make the market more efficient and 
effective.81  China is thus best advised to further develop its financial 
markets by investigating the applicability of such financial tools, while at 
the same time strengthening its regulatory system to avoid abuse. 
What is required is a more effective regulatory framework that can 
take on the increasingly complex challenge of providing coordinated 
supervision of innovative financial products and multi-service financial 
groups.  This challenge has been acknowledged worldwide, as U.S. 
federal regulators now admit in relation to the most recent financial crisis 
that “neither the investors, nor the rating agencies, nor the regulators, nor 
even the firms that designed the securities fully appreciated the risks those 
securities entailed . . . in part because the regulators—like most financial 
firms and investors—did not fully understand or appreciate them.”82 
As discussed earlier, China presently adopts a traditional sectoral 
system of financial regulation, which has exhibited several inadequacies in 
meeting the regulatory challenges in a rapidly changing market.  This 
author has discussed the issue elsewhere through a comparative analysis 
of the relevant experiences in some advanced economies including the 
U.S., the UK and Australia.  Each of these jurisdictions represents a 
different regulatory approach, namely the ‘multiple-regulators’ model or 
‘sectoral regulation’ model in the U.S., the ‘single-regulator’ model or 
‘integrated regulation’ model in the UK, and the ‘twin peaks’ model or 
‘objectives-based regulation’ model in Australia.  When looking to 
overseas regulatory models for guidance, one must take into account not 
only the advantages and disadvantages in doing so, but also of the local 
conditions in China.  This author suggests that “the U.S. model merits 
consideration in the short term, [and that] with further growth of China’s 
financial markets in the long run the Australian model provides the 
preferred direction for reform.”83 
With regard to China’s systems of financial dispute resolution, 
following the financial crisis, China saw the emergence of CIETAC’s 
financial dispute resolution mechanism.  However the use of this 
mechanism has been minimal.  Why might that be?  In general, CIETAC 
is amongst the most well known arbitral institutions in China and the first 
to introduce a financial dispute resolution system.  Therefore, it is not the 
                                                 
81 See generally Christina A. Johnson, At the Intersection of Bank Finance and Derivatives: 
Who Has the Right of Way?, 66 TENN. L. REV. 1 (1998) (discussing securitization and 
derivative transactions); Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: 
Evolution, Current Issues and New Frontiers, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1369 (1991) (discussing 
securitization's role in broadening borrower access to the capital markets and reducing 
borrowing costs). 
82 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Res. Bank, Remarks at the Dallas Regional Chamber, 
Economic Challenges: Past, Present, and Future (Apr. 7 2010), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100407a.pdf. 
83 Huang, supra note 1, at 254. 
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lack of awareness or the absence of a specialized program that has 
deterred users:  one reason might be that while CIETAC case handling 
fees are less expensive when compared with other international arbitration 
venues, CIETAC fees in domestic cases can be high.84  As a result, case 
fees may potentially cost out midsize businesses.  A sliding scale fee for 
midsize businesses may make CIETAC financial arbitration more 
attractive for such entities.  In addition, because pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses in standard form contracts can be held invalid in a number of 
circumstances under the PRC Law,85 this presents an additional barrier to 
CIETAC use by small and midsize businesses.  It is possible to “tick the 
box” to select arbitration, but in practice, few people choose to do this.  
Therefore, greater awareness is needed among small businesses regarding 
the benefits of arbitration as well as a commensurate sliding scale fee to 
make the arbitration process more accessible. 
                                                 
84 See Arbitration Fee Schedule, CIETAC 
http://www.cietac.org/index/applicationForArbitration/47601fd5a0e7e87f001.cms (listing 
a schedule of fees charged for cases accepted for arbitration based on the amount in 
dispute) (last visited Aug. 26, 2011). 
85 See Application by Qiu Donglan and Wu Feng for Confirming Validity of an Arbitration 
Agreement (Kunming Interm. Ct., First Civil Div. Jan. 21, 2009) (initial ruling, Case 
No.1); see also Kunming Intermediate People's Court Civil Ruling (上海高院通报8起风
险 警 示 案 例 ) CHINALAWINFO (2009), 
http://fjthk.now.cn:7751/vip.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/slc/slc.asp?db=fnl&gid=1175
99234 (last visited Feb. 21, 2012) (discussing the hearing for Qiu Donglan and Wu Feng).  
In that case, the applicants and the respondents were parties to a contract for sale and 
purchase of commodity housing, of which Article 14 was a standard arbitration clause 
submitting the dispute to Kunming Arbitration Commission.  Although the Court held that 
Article 14 was valid, it suggested that a standard arbitration clause could be invalidated if 
there was evidence indicating that: 
 
(1) the scope of the arbitration agreement exceeded that permitted by law, 
any of the parties concerned was incapable of concluding the 
arbitration agreement, or the agreement was obtained by coercion 
(Art. 17 of the Arbitration Law of the PRC); 
(2) the arbitrable matters and the choice arbitration commission were not 
clearly specified (Art. 18 the Arbitration Law of the PRC); 
(3) the arbitration agreement excluded the liabilities of the party 
supplying the agreement, increased the liabilities of the other party, or 
deprived the other party of any of its material rights (Art. 40 of the 
Contract Law of the PRC); 
(4) the agreement was obtained by fraud or duress, the parties colluded in 
bad faith, the parties intended to conceal an illegal purpose, the 
agreement was harmful to the public interest, or the agreement 
violated any law or administrative regulation (Art. 52 of the Contract 
Law of the PRC); 
(5) the agreement excluded liabilities for personal injury or liabilities for 
property loss caused by intentional misconduct or gross negligence 
(Art. 53 of the Contract Law of the PRC). 
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Despite handling a limited number of cases, CIETAC has been 
generally effective in providing a forum for the resolution of commercial 
disputes, while its hearing of financial-related disputes continues to have 
much scope for growth.  In order to further strengthen CIETAC’s role in 
providing a venue for the resolution of financial related disputes, there is a 
need to provide further training to arbitrators so that they become well 
versed in financial systems, laws and regulations.86  In addition, CIETAC 
may consider drafting a general model clause for use in financial product 
sales contracts.  This will make CIETAC a more attractive venue of the 
resolution of financial disputes. 
On the other hand, the Financial Division of the Shanghai Courts 
has had extensive exposure to financial and commercial cases.  It has 
handled more than 260,000 civil and financial-related cases.87  Comparing 
case intake and exposure with that of CIETAC, it is clear that the 
Shanghai Courts have developed extensive familiarity with financial 
related disputes. 
With respect to both CIETAC and the Financial Division of the 
Shanghai Courts, further training and development is necessary.  It is 
suggested that a comprehensive financial dispute resolution training 
program consider the inclusion of both a course-based program followed 
by an examination and an in-person evaluation program.  The course 
content could include topics such as the arbitration process, ethical 
considerations, how to determine potential conflicts of interest, managing 
the hearing process, fairness and impartiality, determining the facts of a 
case and the relevant law, and drafting an award.  Such a training program 
will enhance the competency of the arbitrators and the confidence of the 
parties in the proceedings. 
In addition to a comprehensive training program, providing 
potential parties with a draft clause to include in their contractual 
agreements will provide a clear route to resolution.  The following 
essential elements must be included in a valid arbitration clause:  the 
administering institution, the arbitration rules, reference to any dispute 
arising out of the agreement, the place (seat) of arbitration, the number of 
arbitrators, the method of selection and replacement of arbitrators, the 
language of arbitration and the rules of law governing the contract.  In 
addition to these essential elements, the parties may also consider 
including terms such as the allocation of costs, time limits and discovery 
considerations. 
                                                 
86  See also Shahla F. Ali & John Koon Wang Kwok, After Lehman: International 
Response to Financial Disputes—A Focus on Hong Kong, 10 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 
151, 166–67 (2011) (discussing basic training methods and programs in the mediation 
scheme). 
87 Shanghai Fayuan Falü Wenshu Jiansuo Zhongxin, supra note 74. 
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The authors are of the view that given CIETAC’s limited exposure 
to banking and financial sector disputes, in the immediate term, parties are 
advised to seek resolution through reference to local financial division 
dispute resolution mechanisms such as the financial division of the 
Shanghai Courts.  In the long term, prospects for greater strengthening of 
national mechanisms such as CIETAC and the Securities Dispute 
Resolution scheme will provide additional avenues of recourse. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article has shown that China’s systems of financial dispute 
resolution and regulation have undergone significant changes since 
economic reforms in the late 1990s.  The current Chinese regulatory 
regime is broadly similar to its United States counterpart, adopting a 
traditional sectoral regulatory structure.  It comprises the PBC as the 
central bank and three sector-specific regulators, namely the CBRC, the 
CSRC, and the CIRC responsible for banking, securities and insurance 
respectively.  Similarly, its financial dispute resolution structures are just 
emerging at the provincial level as specialized programs within courts and 
arbitral tribunals. 
The authors recommend that in the short term, given CIETAC’s 
limited exposure to banking and financial sector disputes, parties seek 
resolution through reference to local financial division dispute resolution 
mechanisms such as the financial division of the Shanghai Courts.  In the 
long term, prospects for greater strengthening of national mechanisms 
such as CIETAC and the Securities Dispute Resolution scheme will 
provide additional avenues of recourse. 
